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The number of lawyers representing athletes and other sports per-
sonalities has increased markedly in the past several years.' There are
many reasons for this increase. First, there are considerable financial re-
wards in a sports representation practice. For example, from 1982 to
1988 the number of millionaire sports personalities grew from twenty-
three to one hundred-eighteen.2 This lucrative aspect, coupled with the
perceived allure of the professional contracting process, has prompted a
rush to represent clients in this area.
More significantly, athletes have turned to the legal profession for
representation because of the widespread and much publicized abuses by
sports agents. a Sports agents are occasionally reputed to be incompetent
* University of Alabama (B.S., 1975; J.D., 1979); University of Florida (LL. M., in Tax-
ation, 1980). The author, of Fraley & Associates, P.A., in Orlando, Florida, represents various
sports interests, including players, coaches, and teams.
** University of Alabama (B.A., 1986; J.D. expected, 1989). The author served as a sum-
mer associate in 1988 with Fraley & Associates.
1. "There has been an increasing move over the past five years for attorneys to represent
players. Out of the 150 people who are currently representing [baseball] players, between 50
and 60% actually are attorneys." Telephone interview with Arthur Shack, Counsel to the
Major League Baseball Players' Association (July 21, 1988). Sports clients not turning to the
legal profession have traditionally retained sports agents, discussed infra note 3.
2. Sport 100: Who Makes What in Sports, SPORT, June 1988 at 23. The average salaries
in the three major professional sports leagues, which clearly show the financial potential in
sports representation, are as follows: baseball, $412,454; football, $250,000; basketball,
$510,000. Information provided by the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA),
National Football League Players Association (NFLPA), and National Basketball Players As-
sociation (NBPA) (July 1, 1988).
3. Legally, an agent is defined as "[o]ne who acts for or in place of another by authority
from him," or "[o]ne who deals not only with things ... but with persons, using his own
discretion as to means, and frequently establishing contractual relations between his principal
and third persons," or "[a] business representative, whose function is to bring about, modify,
[or] affect ... contractual obligations between principal and third persons." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 59 (5th ed. 1979). As used in this article, sports agents are not only those that
represent professional athletes in any sport, but those that attempt to do so, both within and
outside the legal profession. For a further look at sports agents, see J. WEISrART & C. LOW-
ELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 319-33 (1979) [hereinafter WEISTART & LOWELL]; Special Re-
port, Agents: What's the Deal?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 74.
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and to charge unreasonable fees.4 Even worse, agents have been crimi-
nally charged with tampering with sporting events5 and conspiracy to
commit extortion.6 Not surprisingly, they are particularly responsible
for an onslaught of legislation directed at the sports representation indus-
try.7 These and other agent abuses, coupled with athletes' increasing re-
liance on the legal profession for representation, have resulted in
increased scrutiny of the lawyer's behavior in the area of sports represen-
tation. Accordingly, increased public scrutiny requires that sports law-
yers pay special attention to the ethical rules of their profession. This is
especially true considering the competitiveness of this practice.'
4. See Special Report, supra note 3, at 74. In the past, agents commonly violated the
"early signings" rule of the National Collegiate Athletic Association [hereinafter NCAA],
which prohibits eligible college athletes from signing representation agreements. See infra note
55.
By adopting a Code of Ethics and initiating an organized continuing education program,
sports agents and the Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes [hereinafter
ARPA] have attempted to improve their ethical standards. The ARPA Code of Ethics ad-
dresses many of the same issues as the various ethical codes of the legal profession. See ARPA
Code of Ethics, reprinted in G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 284-90
(1987) (outlining basic duties such as conflicts of interest, competence, and reasonable fees).
The primary criticism of these efforts centers on the problems of enforceability. See Sobel, The
Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 701, 723 (1987) (not-
ing that since membership in the ARPA is not legally required, the Code of Ethics is not
effective in remedying inadequacies of the law in dealing with the abuses of the sports agent).
5. See Mortensen, Walters will go on Trial Today, Alabama Prosecutor: - 'We're Going
to Show Those Agents,' The Atlanta Constitution, May 9, 1988, at 7D, col. 5 (describing the
indictments in Alabama state court of several agents for commercial bribery, deceptive trade
practices, and tampering with a sports contest); see also Scorecard, Soft Time, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, May 23, 1988, at 13. These indictments followed the conviction of another agent for
tampering with a sporting event. See Former Sports Agent Guilty, Abernethy Sentenced to One
Year in Jail, The Montgomery Advertiser, March 2, 1988, at 1 A, col. 4.
6. Two New York sports agents were indicted in federal court in 1988 for mail fraud,
racketeering and conspiracy to commit extortion, in their dealings with 44 eligible student-
athletes of the NCAA. See Selcraig, The Deal Went Sour: Sports Agents Norby Walters and
Lloyd Bloom were Indicted for Racketeering and Extortion, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5,
1988, at 32.
7. Sports agents have historically been unregulated. Encouraged by the aggravated con-
duct of several agents, in particular Norby Walters, Lloyd Bloom, and Jim Abernethy, 15
states' legislatures have passed laws requiring agents, and anyone serving in that role, to be
certified. See generally Sobel, supra note 4; Kohn, Sports Agents Representing Professional
Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to Say You're Qualified, 6 THE ENT. & SPORTS
LAW. 1 (1988). The most recent states to pass such legislation are Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio and Tennessee. As of 1988 how-
ever, these states, while vigorously pursuing and passing the laws, have not strictly enforced
them.
8. For example, there are 227 "player agents" (encompassing lawyers and agents) regis-
tered with the NBPA and the Committee on Agent Registration and Regulation, while there
are only 275 player-clients in that league. Information provided by Lori Weisman, Adminis-
trative Assistant to the NBPA (Aug. 1, 1988).
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This article discusses the most debated issue in the area of sports law
and ethics-solicitation. Indeed, forbidding lawyers from recommending
legal employment to prospective clients raises unique issues in the con-
text of sports representation.
After summarizing the policy and purpose of the rules prohibiting
lawyer solicitation, the article examines the recent United States
Supreme Court decision regarding solicitation, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n. 9 This discussion includes the applicability of the case to the sports
law area.
The article further analyzes various viewpoints in favor of and in
opposition to the rules of solicitation as they apply to the sports lawyer,
as well as persuasive arguments for exceptions in this area. Finally, the
various policy considerations will be applied to hypothetical situations
that would likely arise in the sports representation industry.
II. THE POLICY AND PURPOSE OF SOLICITATION
"A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospec-
tive client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional rela-
tionship, by mail, in-person, or otherwise, when a significant motive for
the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. '"
The above rule and its predecessors" have stirred up more debate
9. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), rev'g 726 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1987).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. The rule continues with a broad definition of "solicit." Actions that constitute solici-
tation include "contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by
other communication directed to a specific recipient .. " The rule also broadly labels certain
conduct as not falling within solicitation. Solicitation does not include "letters addressed or
advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the
kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in
general find such services useful." MODEL RULE 7.3. The rationale of Rule 7.3 in allowing
direct mail to those not needing legal services is to keep such contact from persons whose
emotional or physical condition makes them susceptible to lawyer overreaching. C. WOLF-
RAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 784 (1986). The Supreme Court has recently held that this
type of direct mail contact (including mail to those known to be in need of legal services) is
constitutionally protected commercial speech. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
11. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1969) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE] forbids attorneys from "recommend[ing] employment as a private practitioner
... to a lay person who has not sought his advice .... The original 1908 Canons of Ethics
were even more strict, requiring members of the legal profession to inform the authorities
immediately of this type of behavior, "to the end that the offender may be disbarred." Canon
28 (1908). Model Rule 1.7, of course, prohibits solicitation, both in-person and through the
mail. Evidence of breaking from the strict traditional approach to solicitation (primarily con-
stitutional considerations) can be seen in an early draft of the 1983 Model Rules. The early
draft would have lifted the blanket prohibition on in-person solicitation in favor of a rule
permitting solicitation absent physical, emotional, or mental conditions diminishing the cli-
1989]
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regarding lawyers in the sports representation industry than any other
rule of professional conduct. Indeed, the "evils" of seeking prospective
clients through in-person solicitation are at the forefront of discussions of
ethics and the sports lawyer. 12 This section outlines the policies and pur-
poses behind these ethical rules.
A. The Prevention of Unscrupulous Tactics and Overreaching;
Maintaining the "Profession"
Solicitation is an unrequested communication to a non-lawyer made
for the purpose of obtaining professional legal employment. The legal
profession has traditionally frowned on this type of behavior for a
.number of reasons.
First, the solicitation rules address problems similar to those which
sports agents have caused:13 the concern of the bar in protecting the pub-
lic from potentially coercive "sales pitches." This concern, as stated in
the landmark case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 4 and reflected in
the Model Rules, was prompted by in-person solicitation, dangers of de-
ception, overreaching, undue influence, intimidation, and other forms of
"vexatious conduct."' 5
Second, solicitation is frowned upon because it supposedly lowers
the status of the legal profession. As legal professionals, lawyers perform
a public service, 6 which traditionally has not coexisted with the com-
ent's judgment about the selection of a lawyer. However, this rule was not enacted. See G.
SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 4, at 146-47 (citing MODEL RULE 9.3
(Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980)); Figa, Lawyer Solicitation Today and Under the Proposed
Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 394 (1981).
12. See generally Sobel, supra note 4, at 714-16; R. Berry & G. Wong, Law and Business of
the Sports Industries, Vol. 1, at 213-14 (1986); G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE,
supra note 4, at 145-47; Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in Professional and Amateur
Sports: The Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need for Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV.
815, 830-33 (1981).
13. The general heading for this type of agent abuse is "overly aggressive client recruit-
ment practices." Sobel, supra note 4, at 714-16 (summarizing the overall issue of this particu-
lar agent abuse, including various types of illegal inducements). For a complete discussion of
aggressive recruitment and "early signings" of eligible student-athletes, see infra note 55.
14. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
15. Id. at 462. Other "substantive evils" of solicitation, as the Supreme Court stated, in-
clude stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and
under-representation. Id. at 461.
16. These self-imposed rules against solicitation can be traced to the early English bar,
when lawyers were predominantly members of the upper class who practiced as a public ser-
vice instead of a business. Solicitation, like advertising, was considered undignified since com-




mercialization of ordinary businesses. 17
Third, solicitation has been prohibited in order to preserve the pro-
fession's standards and dignity. Since lawyers are officers of the court,
any undignified conduct reflects negatively on the entire justice system.'
Finally, solicitation has been banned to promote unity among members
of the legal profession by preventing "client stealing. '"'9
While maintaining professional standards is an important interest,
the ban on in-person solicitation does not clearly protect it. The connec-
tion between solicitation and the erosion of professionalism is tenuous at
best. Such an argument is "severely strained,"2 as it is predicated upon
an assumption that lawyers would conceal from themselves and their cli-
ents the real-life fact that they earn their livelihood at the bar.2'
There are arguments opposed to the stated objectives of lawyer so-
licitation. For example, as stated above, professional standards are main-
tained by protecting consumers from unscrupulous attorneys.
Nevertheless, the rules against solicitation serve to restrict the flow of
information to potential clients regarding legal services.
22
However persuasive the counterarguments may be, solicitation man-
dates are consistently upheld. States have "important" interests to pro-
tect, and can constitutionally "discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in
person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers
17. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 148 (1935) (stat-
ing that solicitation is improper because it commercializes the bar; "[T]he practice of law is a
profession and not a trade."). See also Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7
VAND. L. REV. 677, 684 (1954).
18. H. DRINKER, supra note 16, at 212.
19. Id. at 190-91, 211 n.6. See MODEL CODE EC 2-30 (if lawyer knows a client has previ-
ously obtained counsel, he should not accept employment in the matter unless the other coun-
sel approves or withdraws, or the client terminates the prior employment).
20. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 351, 368 (1977) ("the postulated connection
between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism [is] severely strained").
21. Id. at 368.
22. The Bates case addressed the issue of information regarding legal services, holding that
states may not prohibit truthful newspaper advertising regarding the availability of routine
legal services. Per se bans on advertising and solicitation do not clearly address consumer
concerns, because they restrict the flow of information to potential clients regarding legal serv-
ices. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374 n.30. The court stated that a referral system for attorneys' gaining
future business "may have worked when the typical lawyer practiced in a small, homogeneous
community in which ascertaining reputational information was easy for a consumer, [but]
commentators have seriously questioned its current efficacy." Id. These outright bans on ad-
vertising and solicitation represent a misconception of how reputational information is dissem-
inated in a complex urban setting. Id. See also Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The
Court's Unsteady Course, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 401, 414-15 (1980).
In 1977, the Bates Court did not allow direct mail solicitation, although in 1988, the
Shapero Court allowed direct targeted mailings. See infra notes 30-48 and accompanying text.
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that the state has a right to prevent. '23
B. Permissible Solicitation: Friends, Relatives, Clients, and Lawyers
The policy behind the solicitation rules clearly indicates that certain
segments of the public are potentially vulnerable to overreaching law-
yers. The facts of Chralik exemplify one such segment, the personal in-
jury client. In Chralik, the in-person solicitation occurred when the
lawyer, following an accident, contacted a hospitalized person who at the
time was likely to be susceptible to the lawyer's "overreaching. "24
This problem of overreaching, along with concerns of invasion of
privacy and harrassment, are obviously not present in all settings. Pro-
fessional rules of conduct recognize this, and allow a lawyer to recom-
mend his or her services to a "close friend, relative, [or] former client."25
These persons are presumably less likely to be subject to unethical prac-
tices or pressures since they know the lawyer, and can better evaluate the
propriety of employing him than could other laymen.26
The solicitation rules also permit lawyers to solicit business from
other members of the bar.27 Once again, the significant risks of over-
reaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy are absent. 28 An ear-
lier version of the ethical rules did not include this exception, as it barred
any solicitation that "stirred up litigation."
'29
23. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449. Among the state interests in banning solicitation that the
Court mentioned were: maintaining the standards of the profession, discouraging fraudulent
claims, lawyer overreaching, overcharging and underrepresentation and protecting the privacy
of individuals. Id. at 460-62.
24. Id. at 449-51. This lawyer also solicited a second client, approaching her shortly after
she was released from the hospital. The lawyer's actions in Ohralik were described as a classic
case of ambulance chasing. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). The attorney also engaged in
other misconduct, including secretly taping a conversation with one of the women. Id. at 451.
25. MODEL CODE DR 2-104(A). The Model Rules do not mention the exception for
friendships, and therefore may be read more narrowly. See MODEL RULE 7.3, supra text
accompanying note 10; see, e.g., Goldthwaite v. Disciplinary Board, 408 So. 2d 504 (Ala.
1982) (allowing an attorney to recommend his employment to chairman of bank, friend and
former client, to represent estate of dying cousin). See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10,
at 788-89.
26. Goldthwaite, 408 So. 2d at 507.
27. MODEL CODE DR 2-103(A) only prohibits contacting "laypersons." Similarly, Model
Rule 7.3 disallows soliciting "a prospective client." The 1969 Code also allows attorneys to
solicit clients when they are employed by a qualified legal services organization. See MODEL
CODE DR 2-103(D).
28. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 789.
29. Id. (citing In re Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1954)).
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III. DIRECT MAIL SOLICITATION: "IN-PERSON" CLIENT
CONTACT DISTINGUISHED
Although in-person solicitation is the primary area of controversy in
sports law, direct mail solicitation and advertising are also relevant in
this area.3" The United States Supreme Court in Shapero3' addressed the
issue of direct mail solicitation.32 The holding, examined in this section,
is a significant step toward relaxing the various types of client contact by
lawyers. Under Shapero, states may no longer categorically prohibit law-
yers from sending letters to potential clients known to face legal
problems, as long as the letters are truthful and nondeceptive.
A. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association
1. Facts
Richard Shapero, a member of the Kentucky bar, applied to the
Kentucky Advertising Commission33 for the approval of a solicitation
letter, so that he could use it to expand his practice. The letter was
targeted at specific homeowners who were facing foreclosure. It men-
tioned the homeowners' rights under federal law, and featured raised
bold letters, which offered free information via a toll free telephone call. 3"
The Commission denied Shapero's application. The denial was is-
sued not because the letter was misleading, rather because a state rule
prohibited mailing or delivering written advertisements "precipitated by
a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or
addressees as distinct from the general public."3  The Kentucky
30. Prospective draft picks are commonly contacted through the mail. Although the
greatest controversy is over direct in-person recruiting of potential clients, sports lawyers must
now recognize the permissibility of direct, targeted letters to sports figures in need of legal
services.
31. See supra note 9.
32. See generally Stoltenberg & Whitman, Essay: Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45
Prrr. L. REv. 381 (1984).
33. This Commission regulates lawyer advertising, as authorized by the Kentucky
Supreme Court. Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(3) (1988).
34. The proposed letter read as follows:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you
may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your home by
ORDERING your creditor (sic) to STOP and give you more time to pay them. You
may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE information on
how you can keep your home. Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I
may be able to do for you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it
is FREE, there is NO charge for calling.
Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1919 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 1919-20, n.2 (citing Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) (1988)). That rule provides
in full:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only if
1989]
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Supreme Court upheld the ethical rule, comparing the likely results of
this specific, direct-mail solicitation to the "evils" addressed in the
Ohralik case, namely, those receiving the letter would be subject to the
pressures of a trained lawyer.36
The United States Supreme Court had to decide whether a state,
without impinging upon lawyers' first and fourteenth amendment rights,
could categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pe-
cuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential
clients known to face particular legal problems.
2. Holding
The Court began its analysis by summarizing its recent decisions in
the area of lawyer advertising and solicitation. 37 Lawyer advertising is
constitutionally protected commercial speech;3 ' nondeceptive commer-
cial speech may be restricted only in the service of a substantial govern-
ment interest.39
The advertising cases that the Court has faced in the past are distin-
guishable from a solicitation case like Ohralik.0 The "unique" features
of in-person solicitation, such as lawyer overreaching and intimidation,
justify a prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such
contact for pecuniary gain. In the context of written advertisements,
that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whom it is also sent
or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted or precipitated
by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees
as distinct from the general public.
Ky. Sup. Ct. Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) (1988). This incorporates the common distinction between
"specific" and "general" contacts with the public seen throughout the ethical rules. This dis-
tinction is usually also one of people who are known to need legal work (e.g., the star college
athlete), and those who are not. This particular rule was upheld by the state bar's Ethics
Committee, finding it consistent with Model Rule 7.3, which allows "advertising circulars dis-
tributed generally to persons ... who are so situated that they might in general find such
services useful." Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
36. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922. For an applicable policy discussion, see supra notes 13-15
and accompanying text.
37. Overall such holdings have evidenced a changing judicial attitude toward the propriety
of lawyer advertising and solicitation. See Note, In-person Solicitation by Public Interest Law
Firms: A Look at the A.B.A. Code Provisions in Light of Primus and Ohralik 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 309 (1981); Note, Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation: The Revised Tennessee Code of
Professional Responsibility, 51 TENN. L. REV. 853 (1984).
38. See supra note 22.
39. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
638 (1985). Zauderer addressed the validity of an Ohio rule prohibiting solicitation of legal
employment for pecuniary gain through advertisements containing information or advice re-
garding a specific legal problem. This categorical prohibition was ruled unconstitutional.
40. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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however, these features are not present. 4 Nevertheless, the Kentucky
Bar Association argued that Chralik evils were present in the Shapero
letter. The Court found this "Ohralik in writing" argument "facile." 42
Noting that the chosen mode of communication was crucial in distin-
guishing the cases, the Court stated that targeted, direct-mail solicitation
"poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence" than actual in-
person solicitation.43 A written communication does not involve "the
coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate" or the
"pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to
the offer of representation."" A reader of this type of communication
could simply avert his eyes.4"
The majority linked printed advertising with written solicitation.
Both of these forms of communication "conve[y] information about legal
services [by means] that [are] more conducive to reflection and the exer-
cise of choice on the part of the consumer than is personal solicitation by
the attorney."46
The argument that the style or features of Shapero's letter47 pro-
moted the high-pressure atmosphere of in-person solicitation also did not
persuade the Court. Although a bland letter with no special stylistic fea-
tures may be less likely to catch the recipient's attention, the Court
stated: "[A] truthful and nondeceptive letter, no matter how big its type
and how much it speculates can never shout at the recipient or grasp him
by the lapels, as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation. The
letter simply presents no comparable risk of overreaching.
48
B. Shapero as Applied to the Sports Lawyer
The Shapero holding, as well as consistent state court opinions,4 9
have virtually given the green light to a certain type of specific client
41. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, -U.S.-, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1921 (1988) (citing
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641-42).
42. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
43. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
44. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
45. Id. at 1922-23 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
46. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1923.
47. See supra note 34.
48. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1924 (citations omitted). The State can thus claim no substan-
tial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to
be read by the recipient; states violate the first amendment with such a prohibition. Id.
49. See, e.g., The Florida Bar News, July 1, 1987, at 2, (citing Advisory Opinion 87-7,
allowing attorneys to send direct mail solicitations to accident victims, provided requirements
of Rule 4-7.3 are met). The Supreme Court had previously suggested in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191 (1981) that direct mail contact would be held as constitutionally protected commercial
speech. See generally G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 4, at 147.
1989]
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contact. This type of contact further expands the advertising rights of
attorneys first established in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.50 Although
the legal profession has not welcomed targeted letters and other direct
mailings with open arms,5 sports lawyers, like all practitioners, may
nevertheless utilize written solicitation to specific clients as an authorized
means for increasing business.
An accident list or foreclosure list is quite similar to a draft list of
prospective professional players. Thus, sports lawyers may aggressively
contact athletes known to need legal services. Just as Shapero offered a
free telephone call, a sports lawyer may suggest that the athlete contact
him about a meeting. Contacting prospective clients in this manner is
now constitutionally permissible, provided, that the sports lawyer's com-
munications are truthful and nondeceptive.
52
As a practical matter however, the holding of Shapero, while a sig-
nificant step by the Supreme Court in the area of attorney solicitation,
will have little impact on the sports representation industry. Athletes
known to need legal services are usually deluged with mail during and
after their college careers. This has been common practice in the sports
representation industry long before the Court approved it in Shapero.53
Although prospective client-athletes receive a considerable volume of
mail, the letters alone have little impact on the selection process of a
representative. These prospective clients are not only accustomed to di-
rect mail contact, but they also have come to expect in-person meetings
with agents and lawyers.54 Any in-person meeting, if initiated by a law-
yer, is clearly outside the scope of contact approved in Shapero.
50. 433 U.S. 351 (1977). See supra note 22.
51. For example, the Florida Bar approved a specific form of client contact where attor-
neys could obtain accident victims' names from police accident reports and then contact the
victims directly by mail advertisements. While such contact was prohibited under the Model
Code, it was approved under Rule 4-7.3(b) of Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. See The
Florida Bar News, July 1, 1987, at 2. The conditions attached included the following: the mail
must not be false or misleading, the top of each page must be marked "advertisement," a copy
must be sent to staff counsel at the bar headquarters and retained there for three years, and if a
form letter, the names and addresses of the addressees must be included. Id. (citing Fla. Rule
4-7.3(b)(l)(a-b).
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. Most of this contact has come from sports agents. See, e.g., Ruxin, Unsportsmanlike
Conduct: The Student-Athlete, the NCAA, and Agents, 8 J.C. & U.L. 347, 356 (1982) (noting
that over 100 sports agents contacted quarterback Neil Lomax in anticipation of the 1981 NFL
draft).
54. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
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IV. BROAD SOLICITATION EXCEPTION FOR SPORTS LAW?
The unscrupulous actions of sports agents have provoked considera-
ble discussion." Because of the many highly publicized cases of agent
abuse, athletes may now consult numerous sources for information re-
garding competent representation.56 While the most blatant abuses come
from agents, there is no hard and fast rule that lawyers are more compe-
tent than agents to represent sports clients.
5 7
55. The most flagrant of these actions, overly aggressive recruitment practices, is similar to
solicitation. See Sobel, supra note 4, at 714-16. See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, supra
note 3, at 319-28. While most of this type of recruiting is conducted by nonattorney agents,
lawyers are increasingly engaging in similar conduct. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying
text. The best known example of recruiting occurs with NCAA student-athletes. Incidents of
"early signings" of these athletes, primarily football players, to representation agreements are
legion. It has been estimated that over one-half of the top NFL prospects every year have
signed representation agreements before their college eligibility expires, whether they are sign-
ing with agents or lawyers. See Bannon, Ex-agent: 80% Sign in School, USA TODAY, Dec.
17, 1987, at C- 1, col. 4 (quoting various sports agents in their estimates of how many of the top
330 senior college football players usually have accepted money from agents or signed with
them prior to ending their eligibility); see also M. TROPE, NECESSARY ROUGHNESS 77 (1987)
(former sports agent Mike Trope claims that during his time as an agent, some sixty percent of
the players drafted by the NFL in the first three rounds had "made a commitment, in one form
or another, to an agent before their senior season ended"); R. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE
TO AGENTS 35-36 (1982) (reporting that 60 to 75% of NFL draftees had made agent commit-
ments prior to NCAA eligibility expiration).
One could only imagine the degree of contact with amateur athletes that does not result in
an actual signed representation agreement. See, e.g., Powers, Coaches, Athletes are Artful Hus-
tlers, Too, THE SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 16, 1987, at 12 (sports agents Norby Walters and
Lloyd Bloom "crisscrossed the country for the last two years, making pitches to virtually every
football player they thought might go in the first three rounds of the NFL draft").
56. See, e.g., R. RUXIN, supra note 55; E. GARVEY, THE AGENT GAME: SELLING PLAY-
ERS SHORT (1984); NCAA Manual, A Career in Professional Sports: Guidelines that Make
Dollars and Sense (1984); G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 4, at 127-30;
Ruxin, supra note 53, at 347; Neff, A Clean Sweep: How to Deal With the Agents, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987 at 102, 104.
57. It could be argued that general practitioners are not, at least initially, competent to
undertake representation of a sports client. While many lawyers feel that the knowledge and
experience gained while acting as a negotiator in a general practice are immediately transfera-
ble to professional sports contract negotiation, this is not necessarily true. A practitioner in
the sports representation industry encounters a wide range of issues which are familiar to a
seasoned agent but outside the immediate knowledge of a general practitioner. See, e.g.,
ARPA Code of Ethics, supra note 4, Rule 1-104(C) (agents and lawyers required to become
familiar with standard uniform player contracts, constitution and bylaws of the applicable
league, as well as "such other relevant documents affecting wages, hours and working condi-
tions of the players in the sport or sports in which [the lawyer] represents professional ath-
letes").
These lawyers, of course, may later acquire the necessary expertise through independent
study and investigation or through associating with a competent sports lawyer. See generally
MODEL RULE 1.1 ("Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thorough-
ness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."). This requirement is no
different than a lawyer referring a matter outside his adopted area of specialization.
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It has, however, been stated that athletes are generally better repre-
sented by lawyers.5" Nevertheless, lawyers often find themselves at a
competitive disadvantage in attempting to acquire sports clients.5 9 The
solicitation rules are fair throughout the legal profession and apply
equally to all lawyers. Yet, in an industry where lawyers must compete
with agents for clients, they are prevented from taking part in the open
recruiting practices of agents.6 °
In the area of sports law, not all sports agents are attorneys. 61 Be-
cause attorneys are bound by professional ethical restraints, 62 agents en-
joy an "unfair advantage, ' ' 6' even though the particular client might be
better off being represented by a lawyer and the full services of a law
firm.
One possible solution then, would be to relax the solicitation
prohibitions that currently bind attorneys in the sports law area.64 A
"sports law exception" would be restricted to the personal representation
of athletes and other personalities, and thus would not apply to the mul-
titude of other areas falling within the guise of sports law. The following
discussion develops several arguments for such an exception.
58. Neff, supra note 56, at 104 (quoting Barry Rona, Executive Director of the Major
League Baseball Player Relations Committee, as stating: "I would hire a lawyer from a qual-
ity firm, and I'd pay him by the hour"); see also, Kohn, supra note 7, at 15 (athletes benefit
when hiring lawyers over agents because of lawyers' formal legal education and law practice,
which involves negotiating and drafting contracts, and also because legal ethics codes curb
dishonest and incompetent representation).
59. Comment, supra note 12, at 832-33.
60. Id. at 831.
61. Over the past five years, for various reasons, there has been a tendency to turn to
lawyers over nonlawyer agents. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the
competition from agents remains strong.
62. For example, some lawyers will not follow the ethical codes, stating that the codes are
"largely irrelevant" because of the legal profession's historical failure to enforce them. Aron-
son, Reforms are Needed to Correct Malaise in Enforcement of Canons of Ethics, 2 Nat'l L. J.,
Nov. 26, 1979 at 27, col. 1.
63. Comment, supra note 12, at 832.
64. See id. at 842-44; see also Winter, Is the Sports Lawyer Getting Dunked?, 66 ABA J.
701 (1980) (suggesting a loosening of the ethics rules against solicitation to help lawyers com-
pete in the market, following a quote from former NFLPA Executive Director Ed Garvey that
nonlawyer agents "solicit clients with gusto").
As a practical matter, even attorneys already representing sports figures likely gained
their clients by solicitation. They typically attempt to "segregate" their practice, and hold
themselves out as sports agents, thus fully participating in in-person recruitment like other
agents. For a discussion of attorneys serving in the roles of "agents," and not following the
ethical mandates of the legal profession, see infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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A. The Nature of the Industry is Such That Sports Figures
Expect In-Person Contact
The customs in the sports representation industry are different from
those in other fields of legal practice, especially in the areas of represen-
tative conduct and client expectation. Arguably then, the solicitation
rules should not apply. Because potential sports clients are located
throughout the country, a referral system for sports clients is unrealistic.
Furthermore, because of the competition from agents and some sports
lawyers, clients have become accustomed and indeed expect, in-person
solicitation.
One argument for a sports law exception arises when comparing the
realities of the sports representation industry to lawyer advertising gener-
ally. Of course, the ideal method of attracting clients is by referral, but
this has become difficult in the competitive urban settings of most law
firms. In turn, competition has brought about truthful and nondeceptive
advertising as a permissible alternative for attracting legal business.65
As mentioned above, a referral system for sports lawyers is unrealis-
tic in light of the national and international scope of potential sports cli-
ents. Thus, sports lawyers are not practicing in a "small, homogeneous
community,"66 where referrals remain the primary means for attracting
clients.
In addition to the broad geographical client base, competition in the
sports representation industry is a factor in the dispute over in-person
solicitation bans on sports lawyers. Nonattorney agents, and even some
lawyers, openly recruit clients throughout the country.6 7 Because of this
extensive contact, sports clients expect approaches regarding possible
representation. Therefore, denying sports lawyers their right to recom-
mend their own employment punishes not only the lawyer, but the client
as well. The attorney's business development is frustrated, and the client
is denied valuable information concerning legal services and possibly
lower representation fees.68
65. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374. See supra note 22.
66. Id. at 374 n.30. See supra note 22.
67. See supra note 55, infra note 87.
68. For example, one argument in the sports law field is that lawyers, as opposed to agents,
are more likely to bill sports clients by the hour, while agents commonly command a percent-
age of the total dollar value of the negotiated contract. See R. Ruxin, supra note 55, at 55-56.
But see Special Report, supra note 3, at 83 (stating an hourly rate arrangement may erode the
development of a personal relationship with a client, as the client may worry about when the
meter is turned on and off).
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. Sports Clients are "Sophisticated" Persons
The traditional purposes for banning lawyer solicitation 69 serve im-
portant state interests and are currently valid in the other areas of the
legal profession. Those stated reasons, however, do not justify prohibit-
ing the solicitation of sports clients. It could hardly be argued that a
college all-star, for example, is "overwhelmed" by his legal troubles. He
typically does not suffer from an "impaired capacity for good judg-
ment,"7 and is, thus, not at risk of being susceptible to undue influence.
Sports personalities are likely to have experienced more high pow-
ered face-to-face contact than members of the general public. Many of
them have been subject to media scrutiny during their college careers and
earlier,7" since many star athletes are heavily recruited from high school.
The process of selecting a lawyer or agent, and the subsequent signing of
a representation agreement, differs little from signing a National Letter
of Intent72 with an academic institution.
Further, while the athletes' subsequent collegiate status is labelled
"amateur, ' 73 more realistically, they are an integral part of a lucrative
business relationship with the university or college. 74 They are compen-
sated by their scholarships and other benefits, and more properly are
"professionals. ' 75
Thus, sports personalities do not require ordinary consumer safe-
guards against overreaching, undue influence, and intimidation.76 Their
69. Such reasons include the desire to curb unscrupulous lawyers and to maintain profes-
sional standards. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
70. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
71. See Horn, Intercollegiate Athletics: Waning Amateurism and Rising Professionalism, 5
J.C. & U.L. 97 (1977-79) (noting that the student-athlete is subject to a massive sports press,
organized to satisfy a national audience).
72. The National Letter of Intent program was devised by the NCAA as a compulsory
program whereby the student certifies his intention to attend a particular institution. See
Note, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 96, 114 (1985).
73. The NCAA defines an "amateur" as "one who engages in a particular sport for the
educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and to whom participation
in that sport is an avocation." NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1. This definition has been under
much scrutiny from commentators. The controversy seems to center around whether the
NCAA has failed to clearly distinguish college athletics from professional sports.
74. See Koch, The Economics of "Big-Time" Intercollegiate Athletics, 52 Soc. Scl. Q. 248,
258 (1971) (providing a microeconomic model of the business conducted by major college
athletic programs, and reporting that revenues actually exceed costs at such institutions). See
also Barile v. Univ. of Virginia, 2 Ohio App. 3d 233, 240, 441 N.E.2d 608, 616 (Ohio Ct. App.
1981).
75. Comment, Compensation for Collegiate Athletics: A Run for More Than the Roses, 22
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 701, 702 (1985).
76. But see G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 4, at 147 ("Given the
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past experiences often sufficiently prepare them to evaluate the sales
pitches and appeals of a lawyer offering his legal services.77 Star athletes,
in short, are usually well equipped to face the "evils" of in-person contact
with an attorney regarding a possible professional relationship.
7 8
C. The Governing Bodies are Unconcerned
The regulators79 of sports representatives have shown little concern
about the face-to-face contact between the athletes and representatives.
disparity in sophistication between lawyer-agents and many athletes, some limitation on in-
person solicitation of athletes seems desirable.").
77. See, e.g., Note, Soliciting Sophisticates: A Modest Proposal for Attorney Solicitation, 16
U. MICH J. L. REF. 585 (1983) (advocating an amendment to the ethical standards to permit
personal solicitation of prospective clients who qualify as "sophisticated," defined as those
persons having general knowledge of their legal needs and the expertise to assess adequately
the information and presentation of an attorney).
While it is argued that athletes' past experiences may serve as a reason for a sports law
exception to the solicitation rules, clearly, this argument may be only theoretical. As a practi-
cal matter, some athletes, as much or even more than the general public, may suffer from an
"impaired capacity for good judgment." This is exemplified in the following settings.
One egregious scenario concerns the athlete whose academic institution exploits him for
the tangible benefits that he can provide the school, such as gate receipts, radio and television
contracts, and alumni gifts. Cases are legion of student-athletes completing their playing eligi-
bility, but lacking basic reading and writing skills. See Note, supra note 72, at 106-08 (institu-
tions should be accountable to the uneducated athlete, as they have an "inherent conflict of
interest," such that when confronted with an athlete who represents the potential for signifi-
cant pecuniary gain, but who suffers from learning deficiencies, they are apt "to dismiss the
'student first, athlete second' precept").
Other examples are more relevant to the present discussion of athletes' ability not only to
know their legal needs, but also to assess the information and presentation of a lawyer. While
allegations of "early signings," see supra note 55, have been primarily directed at sports agents,
the athletes party to such transactions have arguably been as blameworthy. The 44 athletes
recently linked to a federal indictment of two sports agents, see supra note 6, were at best naive
in openly accepting cash gifts and signing representation agreements in violation of NCAA
rules.
Additionally, while many athletes are accustomed to face-to-face contact, they have not
always demonstrated that they are "well equipped" to select an agent or lawyer properly. See,
e.g., Papanek, A Lot of Hurt: Inaction Got Kareem Creamed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19,
1987, at 89 (reporting the lackadaisical and trusting faith of NBA star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar,
who suffered financially at the hands of his agent and business manager Tom Collins);
Keteyian, 'At Times You Flat Cry,' How LaRue Harcourt's Baseball Player Clients Were
Driven to Tears, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 90 (reporting the trust of fourteen
athletes in their agent who commingled and lost his clients' funds).
78. A further interest in banning solicitation is to guard against deception. The ethical
rules adequately address deception generally, in provisions outside of the solicitation rules. See
MODEL CODE DR 2-101(A); MODEL RULE 7.1.
79. Agent regulation plans have been frequently adopted since the early 1980s. The
number of states which have included such a regulatory scheme has increased rapidly in 1987-
88. See supra note 7. Players association schemes are binding on those representing athletes as
well. See, e.g., NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors [hereinafter NFLPA Regu-
lations], a section of which is cited infra note 81. Also, the NCAA adopted its own agent
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This fact weighs in favor of abolishing the solicitation rules for sports
lawyers.
Regulators of solicitation in the sports representation industry have
focused on different concerns than the Ohralik "evils." 8 ° Although there
are rules that prohibit and guide "contract advisors" in dealing with pro-
spective clients, these rules address substantive matters, and do not con-
cern the dignity of the profession or the advances of a lawyer. The evils
that the governing bodies have addressed are those most prevalent in the
industry, including offering bribes to a player, providing materially false
information to a player, and utilizing misleading business titles.81 In
fact, many administrators of the governing bodies openly assume that
attorneys take part in in-person meetings with prospective sports
clients.82
Other governing bodies voice concerns inconsistent with those be-
hind the solicitation policies. For example, the NCAA only forbids an
athlete from signing a representation agreement during the athlete's eligi-
bility. Its regulations even contemplate face-to-face contact between ath-
letes and representatives prior to the expiration of that eligibility.83 Some
state legislatures have sought to protect universities and colleges by at-
tempting to preserve the student-athlete's eligibility for the natural four-
registration program in 1984. See Memorandum to Individuals Acting in the Capacity of
Player Agents (cited in Sobel, supra note 4, at 724-25).
80. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
81. The NFLPA Regulations exemplify the efforts of major sports leagues in curtailing
these practices. The "solicitation" section is as follows:
An NFLPA Contract Advisor is also prohibited from:
(1) Providing or offering to provide anything of significant value to a player in or-
der to become the Contract Advisor for such player;
(2) Providing or offering to provide anything of significant value to any other per-
son in return for a personal recommendation of the Contract Advisor's selection by a
player;
(3) Providing materially false or misleading information to any person in the con-
text of solicitation for selection as the Contract Advisor for any player;
(4) Using titles or business names which imply the existence of professional creden-
tials which he or she does not actually possess; and
(5) Soliciting or accepting anything of value from any club or other NFL manage-
ment personnel for his or her personal use or benefit.
NFLPA Regulations, § 5(C) (1983) (Requirements Concerning Contract Advisor's Conduct).
82. "Our regulations do not mention attorneys. We don't differentiate between agents and
attorneys; our interpretation is that when an attorney is acting as an agent, he is an agent. All
attorneys are in the process of recruiting players. I doubt very seriously that any attorney sits
back and waits for the telephone to ring and players to call him. It just comes down to how
the particular attorney goes about soliciting." Telephone Interview with Mike Duberstein,
Director of Research, NFLPA (July 21, 1988).
83. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(c) ("Securing advice from a lawyer concerning a proposed




year duration.8 4 The only feared contact, in-person or otherwise, is dur-
ing this eligibility term. For example, if a college or university allows an
ineligible athlete to play, it may be forced to return considerable reve-
nues, while its team forfeits victories. These legislatures and other regu-
lators are generally not concerned with lawyers approaching prospective
clients and offering legal services.85
D. Solicitation Consequence: Holding Out As an Agent; Not
"Practicing Law"
Because of the unique nature of the sports representation industry, a
potential option for an attorney attempting to avoid solicitation rules is
to hold himself out solely as a sports agent. A lawyer in this situation
might claim that his conduct is not governed by legal ethical mandates,
but by general fiduciary principles under agency law.
86
Lawyers choosing this route must make sacrifices. They should
completely disavow their bar membership, though some do not. For ex-
ample, a sports lawyer may attempt to avoid violation of solicitation
rules by segregating his roles as "agent" and "lawyer." 87 While this may
appear to be acceptable, the "agent" is more likely to discuss openly the
general advantages of his experience and skills as a lawyer. 88 More im-portantly, by retaining his bar membership, the "agent" is engaged in a
84. All of the states adopting these schemes generally attempt to curtail "early signings"
with agents or lawyers. If a student-athlete with remaining eligibility agrees either orally or in
writing to be represented in the negotiations of a professional sports contract, he or she is
declared ineligible. See NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(c). Various states have attempted, in vary-
ing degrees, to incorporate the above NCAA rules into legislation.
85. Many institutions are implementing a screening process to help student-athletes in
their selection of a proper representative. This can be seen as assisting student-athletes in
dealing with in-person meetings with agents or lawyers. Such a screening process raises inter-
esting solicitation issues. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (nonlaw-
yer sports agent violating conflicts of interest standards, when negotiating on behalf of a player
with a team in which he was part-owner).
87. Many members of the legal profession actively recruit sports clients. Interviews with
various sports lawyers reveal that many of them claim to be "agents" when they are recruiting
their clients, but later claim to be "attorneys" when handling other matters. As a practical
matter, lawyers who act solely as agents can be viewed as a separate industry. "Of course, I
would prefer all athletes to be represented by attorneys. When that is the case, there is a
standard of accountability. In reality, though, members of the industry are not all lawyers.
What you are left with really is a situation of treating this industry as a profession apart from
the law. This is much like the real estate industry; once a lawyer is in that area, he would not
be guided by the various rules such as advertising and solicitation." Telephone interview with
Dick Berthelsen, General Counsel of the NFLPA (Aug. 1, 1988).
88. This statement shows that the segregation obviously is not complete. The "agent"
wants the best of both worlds: to be able to solicit clients without being bound by the ethical
rules, yet claim the skills of a lawyer.
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"law related" occupation, under the Model Code. The Code provisions,
including those against in-person solicitation, apply equally to lawyers
who practice law and those engaged in a law related occupation. 9
Disavowing ties to the legal profession to avoid solicitation rules can
be taken a step further. Assume, for example, that a holder of a law
degree chooses not to become a licensed member of a state bar, or a one-
time member relinquishes his license, but still claims to be a "lawyer" in
his role as sports agent.90 This claim would subject the individual to
unauthorized practice of law statutes, 91 since he would be acting or hold-
ing himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice law.92
Clearly, both of these scenarios illustrate impermissible means of circum-
venting the solicitation rules.
An equally impermissible means of avoiding solicitation rules would
be to form a corporation to solicit sports clients. Courts would likely
disapprove of such a scheme. One state bar opinion held that an attorney
may not serve as a "shareholder, director, or officer ... or legal counsel"
of a corporation organized to represent professional athletes in contract
negotiations.
93
89. See Cole-Wallen, Crossing the Line: Issues Facing Entertainment Attorneys Engaged in
Related Secondary Occupations, 8 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. 481, 501 (citing ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328 (1972), which permits lawyers to
conduct a law practice simultaneously with a law-related occupation, such as an accountant or
real estate broker, "if he complies ... with all provisions of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility while conducting his second, law-related occupation"). The various ethical mandates,
including solicitation, will therefore bind lawyers serving "sports agent" roles, since clearly,
negotiating sports contracts would be law-related. Therefore, the argument that principles of
legal ethics are not binding on lawyers who act as agents is false.
90. Such individuals state, as their reason for not obtaining licenses to practice law, that
attorney solicitation is unethical, yet to obtain sports clients, they must solicit. See, e.g., Ala.
State Bar Disciplinary Comm., Op. 85-73 (1985) [hereinafter Ala. Op. 85-73] (law school grad-
uates who are not bar members but who hold themselves out as attorneys while representing
athletes as agents subject to unauthorized practice of law statutes).
91. One alternative argument is that sports agents are engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law when they represent clients in contract negotiations, and perform other services. See
Comment, supra note 12, at 844-45 ("court[s] should exercise [their] inherent power to confine
... the preparation of contracts for those that are licensed to practice law in this state") (citing
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619, 622 (Wash. 1952)
(Donworth, J., concurring); see generally G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra
note 4, at 149.
92. Ala. Op. 85-73, supra note 90.
93. Kentucky Bar Opinion E-89 (allowing an attorney to advise such a corporation when
employment is confined to normal corporate matters, i.e., his services for legal counsel must
not relate to the negotiations undertaken on behalf of an athlete, or provide legal services for
an athlete). In addition, forming such a corporation may present problems with MODEL CODE
DR 5-107, which requires attorneys to avoid influence by outside interests other than the cli-




Despite the persuasive arguments in favor of further relaxing the
solicitation rules for sports lawyers, 9' the rules are binding even after
Shapero. 95
As mentioned below, the nature of the sports representation indus-
try is one of competition.96 Lawyers in this area battle with agents for
clients throughout the nation, and the agents are not bound by rules of
solicitation. Additionally, athletes are not only accustomed to being
openly recruited, but expect contact by potential representatives.
The field of sports law gives rise to interesting applications of the
solicitation standards. Indeed, just what rises to the level of solicitation
and resulting lawyer discipline can be ambiguous and even inconsistent,
when applying the various provisions of the ABA Code and Model
Rules.
The following discussion poses typical sports law hypotheticals.
They range from clearly permissible client contact to unacceptable in-
person solicitation. A brief analysis under the ethical rules follows each
hypothetical situation.
A. Typical Scenarios
Obviously, a sports lawyer, like any lawyer, may advise and offer
legal services if the client contacts the lawyer. An athlete may even con-
tact a sports lawyer if the athlete has remaining eligibility. This type of
contact commonly occurs when an athlete is deciding whether to "go
hardship," and enter the professional draft early or to continue compet-
ing in college. Lawyers may counsel such athletes, so long as they do not
also agree to represent them for contract negotiations.97 A similar situa-
tion arises when a coach contacts a lawyer to advise several student-ath-
letes on his team. Both scenarios are clearly acceptable referral contact,
which the governing bodies of the legal profession have envisioned.
A lawyer may affirmatively attempt to contact sports clients
through various forms of communication. One method is to send a per-
sonalized, targeted letter directly to an athlete, discussing the athlete's
particular legal needs, such as the need for an effective negotiator for the
athlete's initial contract with his team, estate planning, tax planning, in-
94. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 83.
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surance protection, investment management, endorsements, post career
counseling, and the like.
Should this letter meet the test of Shapero (i.e., truthful and
nondeceptive), it will conform to the new standards for permissible client
contact, even though its target is an athlete who is known to need legal
services. However, various states may require other formalities for ap-
proval, such as filing the letter with the appropriate bar association
committee.98
A lawyer may also try to recommend his services to the athlete by
contacting an institution's Pro-Player Agent Committee,99 with the goal
of meeting with a particular student-athlete or a group of athletes at the
institution. Arguably, these in-person meetings would not amount to so-
licitation because the committees assist the athletes in guarding against
the dangers of direct in-person contact, namely, overreaching and undue
influence. oo
B. Approaching, Violating Solicitation Mandates
Lawyers may also be tempted to utilize third parties to contact pro-
spective sports clients. This commonly occurs when a lawyer who al-
ready represents several athletes as clients, asks one of his clients to
approach an undergraduate athlete to arrange a meeting with the lawyer.
This scenario is similar (albeit on a much smaller scale) to sports
agents and their "runners," individuals who recruit around the country
for sports agents. Here, the lawyer's conduct would be forbidden if he
recommended himself for employment. This is the classic type of third-
party solicitation conduct that Model Rule 7.2(c) forbids, if it includes
the transfer of money or other items of "value" to third parties. 1 ' Any
98. See, e.g., Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Rule 4-7.3(b)(l)(a-b), cited supra note 51.
99. Several schools, such as the University of Alabama, Duke University, the University of
Florida, and the University of Miami, acting on the recent blatant abuses of "early signings" of
eligible student-athletes to representation agreements, have implemented committees to assist
athletes in screening and selecting potential agents or lawyers. See New Miami Policy to Take
Tough Stand Against Sports Agents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 20, 1987, at C-12, col. 1.
100. See G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 4, at 137 (screening com-
mittees help the athlete acquire helpful information about possible representatives; the com-
mittees "may be very productive in eliminating excesses that have been all too common in the
player-agent relationship").
101. MODEL RULE 7.2(c). The provision reads: "A lawyer shall not give anything of value
to a person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reason-
able cost of advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule and may pay the
usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization." Id.
See also MODEL CODE DR 2-103(B), DR 2-101(B).
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transfer of value would be a clear violation and constitute solicitation. 102
Even without actually transferring "value" under Model Rule 7.2,
sports lawyers using third parties to solicit prospective clients may never-
theless violate ethical principles. For example, lawyers often attempt to
develop an extended relationship with certain universities, particularly
those that traditionally produce professional athletes. One state bar com-
mittee has held that it would be professionally improper for a lawyer to
solicit through the university's coach or athletic director, by communi-
cating his availability to represent a particular athlete or that he is en-
gaged in a sports law practice. 103
A fertile recruiting period for sports representatives is during the
various post-season all-star games. Agents commonly outnumber ath-
letes at such events. By frequently attending these types of events, law-
yers may possibly approach or even cross the bounds of permissible
solicitation. For example, a highly visible lawyer may spend a considera-
ble amount of time in the hotel lobby where the athletes are staying. The
lawyer, seeking to meet clients in person, "happens" to meet a particular
athlete. The lawyer then recommends himself for employment. Here,
the lawyer has, for all practical purposes, personally solicited a client.
A lawyer may also seek sports clients by "cold calling" athletes.
The lawyer in such a situation will likely recommend himself for legal
employment and attempt to set up a meeting to discuss the lawyer's serv-
ices, qualifications and experience more fully. As the Shapero case makes
clear, an athlete in this position could not merely "avert his eyes,"'" as
he would with similar contact through the mail. While the content of the
lawyer's communication may be identical to information contained in a
102. One obvious "value" to an existing client would be lower legal fees. For example, an
attorney might tell an existing client that if the client recommends the attorney's services to an
athlete, and that recommendation results in a representation agreement, the client will benefit
from lower legal fees. This would constitute an impermissible third party solicitation. Numer-
ous other examples of "value" can be applied in this situation, whether or not the value consti-
tutes a money payment.
103. See Ill. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 700 (1980) (dual practice and solic-
itation), reprinted in Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 801:3005 (1980-85) ("The
committee is of the opinion, therefore, that the initiation of communications by an attorney to
coaches and athletic directors to inform them of the attorney's availability to represent athletes
would be professionally improper."). That opinion cited Rule 2-103(a) of the Illinois Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a] lawyer shall not by private communication
... directly or through a representative, recommend or solicit employment of himself, his
partner or his associate for pecuniary gain or other benefit and shall not for that purpose
initiate contact with a prospective client." Id. (stating that laypersons selecting a lawyer are
best served if the recommendation is disinterested, and that "a lawyer should not seek to influ-
ence another to recommend his employment").
104. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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direct mailing, communication by telephone would be clearly
impermissible.
Finally, a lawyer violates the solicitation rules when he personally
travels unannounced to the athlete's residence. By recommending him-
self as counsel for the athlete's upcoming needs, the lawyer openly sub-
jects the athlete to the dangers of in-person solicitation. States, of course,
have important interests in curtailing these practices.1"5
VI. CONCLUSION
Modem holdings in the solicitation area now state that lawyers may
directly contact clients known to be in need of legal services, if the form
and content of that communication are of a certain type. While this
modem standard may widely impact the legal profession generally, it will
do little to alter the sports representation industry. The competition be-
tween agents and lawyers is beyond direct mail communication.
Sports clients, seeing this competition first hand, arguably can be
described as "sophisticated," as they have come to expect face-to-face
contact from potential representatives. Additionally, the governing bod-
ies of agents and lawyers in the representation industry are not concerned
with the same "evils" of solicitation as are the disciplinary authorities
throughout the legal profession. All of these factors lead to persuasive
arguments that "solicitation," as the term is applied to all lawyers,
should not apply to sports lawyers.
Notwithstanding these factors, all lawyers are forbidden from ap-
proaching prospective clients and offering their legal services. The pres-
ent solicitation rules particularly limit sports lawyers from developing
and expanding their clientele, and leave them at a competitive disadvan-
tage to sports agents. Sports lawyers must continue to conduct them-
selves according to the ethical standards of the legal profession, and not
those prevalent in the sports representation industry.
105. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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